This paper discusses methods for assigning codewords for the purpose of ngerprinting digital data, e.g., software, documents, music, and video. Fingerprinting consists of uniquely marking and registering each copy of the data. This marking allows a distributor to detect any unauthorized copy and trace it back to the user. This threat of detection will deter users from releasing unauthorized copies.
Introduction
Fingerprinting is an old cryptographic technique. Several hundred years ago logarithm tables were protected by ngerprinting them. The idea was to introduce tiny errors in the insigni cant digits (i.e. tenth digit right of the decimal point) of log x for a few random values of x. A di erent set of x's was chosen for each copy of the logarithm table. If an owner of a logarithm table ever sold illegal copies of it, the tiny errors in the table enabled the \police" to trace an illegal copy back to its owner. The owner would then be prosecuted and penalized in some way.
Nowadays no one is interested in protecting logarithm tables. However, the technique of ngerprinting is still in use. Examples include maps, diamonds and explosives. With the increasing popularity of digital data, there is a strong desire to ngerprint these data as well. Examples of digital data to which ngerprinting may apply include documents, images, movies, music and executables.
When ngerprinting digital data one must address the problem of collusion. For instance, suppose the logarithm table discussed above is stored as a le. Each user is given a slightly altered copy of the le. If two users get together they can easily run diff on their two les to discover all the locations where the les di er. This simple operation reveals the location of the hidden marks. The users can then remove these marks and resell their logarithm table without ever worrying about being caught. Notice that two users could only detect those marks in which their copies di er. They could not detect marks where both their copies agree. We intend to use this small amount of information which the two users could not remove to trace any copy they generate back to one of them.
Throughout the paper we use the following terminology: A mark is a position in the object which can be in one of s di erent states. For instance, in the logarithm table example, introducing an error in the value of log 3 means that log 3 is marked. If there are s error values used we say that the mark has s possible states. A ngerprint is a collection of marks. Thus, a ngerprint can be thought of as a word of length L over an alphabet of size s. Here L is the number of marks embedded in the object. A distributor is the sole supplier of ngerprinted objects. A user is the registered owner of a ngerprinted object. The process of ngerprinting an object involves assigning a unique codeword over L to each user. The user receives a copy of object with the marks set according to his assigned codeword. By colluding, users can detect a speci c mark if it di ers between their copies; otherwise a mark can not be detected.
The main property the marks should satisfy is that users can not change the state of an undetected mark without rendering the object useless. We assume that marks satisfying these properties exist for the objects being ngerprinted. We refer to this as the Marking Assumption for which a precise de nition is given in the next section. Note that if there is no collusion, by the Marking Assumption, ngerprinting is trivial: the ngerprint assigned to each user will be the user's serial number.
There has been much research investigating the Marking Assumption in a variety of domains. Wagner 22] gives a taxonomy of ngerprints and suggests subtle marks for computer software. Marks have been embedded in digital video 20, 6, 9, 10], in documents 5], and in computer programs 12] . In all these domains, our scheme allows these marks to be combined to form collusion resistant ngerprints. Thus our results are general, applying to a variety of digital data.
Previously a weaker model of collusion secure ngerprinting was studied in 4]. Our results are more e cient by an exponential amount both is terms of the number of users and in terms of the coalition size. The reason for this dramatic improvement is our use of randomness. We rely on randomness in two steps: one is in the construction and proof of security of our ngerprinting codes. The other is in the compostion of our construction with earlier elegant results of Chor, Fiat and Naor 8] .
We note that several recent proposals enhance the functionality of ngerprinting schemes in various ways. Assymetric ngerprinting 15, 16, 3] ensures that a corrupt distributor cannot frame an inocent user. Anonymous ngerprinting 17] makes use of a registration service to eliminate the need for the distributor to keep detailed records binding codewords to users. The combinatorial properties required for collusion secure ngerprinting are further studied in 19, 7] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation and explicitely state the Marking Assumption. In Section 3 we discuss a naive scenario to familiarize the reader with the notation. In Section 4 we de ne our notion of collusion secure codes and in Section 5 we construct such codes. In Section 6 we give a lower bound on the length of collusion secure codes. Section 7 describes a scheme for distributing ngerprinted data on bulk media such as CD-ROMs.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. Given an l-bit word w 2 l and a set I = fi 1 ; : : : ; i r g f1; : : : ; lg we denote by wj I the word w i 1 w i 2 : : : w ir where w i is the i'th letter of w.
We refer to wj I as the restriction of w to the positions in I.
Fingerprinting codes
We begin by de ning some notation. From here on will denote some alphabet of size s representing the s di erent states of the marks. The letters in will be denoted by the integers 1 to s.
De nition 2.1 A set ? = fw (1) ; : : : ; w (n) g l will be called an (l; n)-code. The codeword w (i) will be assigned to user u i , for 1 i n. We refer to the set of words in ? as the codebook. De nition 2.2 Let ? = fw (1) ; : : : ; w (n) g be an (l; n)-code and C be a coalition of users. For i 2 f1; : : : ; lg we say that position i is undetectable for C if the words assigned to users in C match in their i'th position. Formally, suppose C = fu 1 ; : : : ; u c g. Then As was discussed in the introduction our objective is to design a collusion-secure method of assigning codewords to users. Let C be a coalition of users. We must rst characterize the set of objects which the coalition C can generate. Suppose the i'th mark is detectable by the coalition C. The coalition can generate an object in which the i'th mark is in any of its s states. Furthermore, the coalition can generate an object in which the mark is in an unreadable state. When the police recovers an illegal copy of the object it can not determine which state an unreadable mark is in. For instance, in the logarithm table example this would correspond to the coalition creating a table which does not contain the entry log 3 where log 3 is a detectable mark. We denote a mark in an unreadable state by '?'. The resulting set of codewords is called the feasible set of the coalition. Formally the feasible set is de ned as follows:
De nition 2.3 Let ? = fw (1) ; : : : ; w 
Protection Against Naive Redistribution
To familiarize the reader with our notation we begin by considering a toy problem which we refer to as naive redistribution. Naive redistribution occurs when a user redistributes his copy of the object without altering it. If an unauthorized copy of the object is found containing user u's codeword we would like to say that user u is guilty. However, u could claim that he was framed by a coalition who created an object containing his codeword. Thus, we would like to construct codes that satisfy the following property: no coalition can collude to frame a user not in the coalition. We usually relax this condition by limiting the size of the coalition to c users. We call such codes c-frameproof codes.
If the code used to ngerprint the object is kept hidden from the users, then the construction of frameproof codes becomes trivial: to every one of the n users assign a unique codeword chosen at random. A coalition of users can not frame a user not in the coalition since they do not know his codeword. We would like to construct codes that are c-frameproof even if the codebook is known to the users. This requirement can be formally stated as follows:
De nition 3.1 A code ? is c-frameproof if every set W ?, of size at most c, satis es F(W)\? = W.
The de nition states that in a c-frameproof code, the only codewords in the feasible set of a coalition of at most c users are the codewords of members of the coalition. Thus, no coalition of at most c users can frame a user who is not a member of the coalition. It is interesting to note that for random codes the length of the code must be exponential in c. Otherwise, a coalition of c users is likely to detect all the bits.
Construction of c-frameproof codes
We now show a construction for c-frameproof codes over the binary alphabet = f0; 1g. First we introduce a simple (n; n)-code which is n-frameproof. De ne the code ? 0 (n) to be the (n; n)-code containing all n-bit binary words with exactly one 1. For example, the code ? 0 (3) for three users is f100; 010; 001g. The following claim is immediate. Claim 3.1 ? 0 (n) is a (n; n)-code which is n-frameproof.
It is not di cult to see that any n-frameproof code must have length at least n. This follows since any coalition of n?1 users must not be able to detect at least one of the bit positions; otherwise, they could frame a user not in the coalition. Since there are n coalitions of size n ? 1, the code must have at least length n. Hence, the code length of ? 0 is optimal. The length of ? 0 is linear in the number of users and is therefore impractical. We will use the code ? 0 to construct shorter codes. We rst recall some basic de nitions from the theory of error correcting codes. g. Since ? is a c-frameproof code we know that w
is not in F(C j ; ?). Since w (z j ) is a subword of W, this implies that W 6 2 F(C; ? 0 ). This contradiction proves the lemma.
We note that the condition that C has a large minimal distance can be relaxed. To make the proof work it su ces to require that no set of c words of C \cover" a word of C outside the set. This property has been studied in 11]. Using this relaxed requirement does not improve the constructions.
The error correcting codes we are using have large minimal distance and hence, low rate. By picking the codewords randomly it is possible to obtain a good low rate code. We state this in the following lemma, which is immediate from the Cherno bound 2, Appendix A]. Proof By Lemma 3.3 we know that there exists an error correcting code with parameters (L; n; L(1? 1=c)) 2c for L = 8c log n. Combining this with the code ? 0 (2c) and Lemma 3.2 we get a c-frameproof code for n users whose length is 2cL = 16c 2 log n.
To make this construction explicit we must use an explicit low rate error correcting code. Explicit constructions of such codes are described in 1]. The explicit construction are not as good as the bounds provided by Lemma 3.3. Using a simple explicit low rate code it is possible to obtain codes of length l = c 2 log 2 (n).
c-secure Codes
We now turn our attention to the full problem of collusion secure ngerprinting. Suppose a distributor marks an object with a code ?. Now, suppose a coalition of users, C, colludes to generate an unregistered object marked by some word x and then distributes this new object. When this object is found, the distributor would like to detect a subset of the coalition who created it. In other words, there must exist a tracing algorithm A which on input x output a member of the coalition C. The tracing algorithm A on input x must output a member of the coalition C that generated the word x. Hence, an illegal copy can be traced back to at least one member of the guilty coalition.
Clearly there is no hope in recovering the entire coalition since some of its members might be passive; they are part of the coalition, but they contribute nothing to the construction of the illegal copy.
We now derive a necessary condition of a code to be totally c-secure. Consider the following scenario: let ? be some code. Let C 1 and C 2 be two coalitions of c users each such that C 1 \ C 2 = ;.
Suppose an unregistered object is found which is marked by a codeword x which is feasible for both C 1 and C 2 . Then both coalitions are suspect. Since their intersection is empty, it is not possible to determine with certainty who created the unregistered object. It follows that if ? is totally c-secure then when the intersection of C 1 and C 2 is empty, the intersection of their feasible sets F(C 1 ) and F(C 2 ) must also be empty. In general we obtain the following lemma: 
; w (2) ; w (3) be three distinct codewords assigned to users u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 respectively. De ne the majority word M = MAJ(w (1) ; w (2) ; w (3) ) by
w (1) i if w (1) i = w (2) i or w (1) i = w (3) i w (2) i if w (2) i = w (3) i ? otherwise One can readily verify that the majority word M is feasible for all three coalitions fu 1 ; u 2 g; fu 1 ; u 3 g; fu 2 ; u 3 g.
However the intersection of the coalitions is empty. Therefore by Lemma 4.1 the code ? is not totally 2-secure.
The proof of the theorem shows that if a coalition employs the`majority' strategy it is guaranteed to defeat all ngerprinting codes. Based on this result it seems that all is lost: ngerprinting is not possible in the presence of collusion. Fortunately there is a way out of this trap: use randomness. Theorem 4.2 forces us to weaken our requirements for marking schemes. We intend to allow the distributor to make some random choices when embedding the codewords in the objects. The point is that the random choices will be kept hidden from the users. This enables us to construct codes which will capture a member of the guilty coalition with high probability.
An (l; n) ngerprinting scheme is a function ?(u; r) which maps a user number 1 u n and a string of random bits r 2 f0; 1g to a codeword in l . The random string r is the set of random bits used by the distributor and kept hidden from the users. We denote a ngerprinting scheme by ? r .
Suppose a coalition C of c users creates an illegal copy of an object. Fingerprinting schemes that enable the capture of a member of the coalition C with probability at least 1 ? are called c-secure codes with -error. Here the probability is taken over the random choices made by the distributor and where the probability is taken over the random bits r and the random choices made by the coalition.
The tracing algorithm A on input x outputs a member of the coalition C that generated the word x with high probability. With this de nition at hand we turn to the construction of c-secure codes.
We point out that Chor, Fiat and Naor 8] considered a similar problem in an entirely di erent settings. In our terms their result enables one to construct c-secure codes under the assumption that marks can not become unreadable. Under this assumption one can even construct totally c-secure codes. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 4.2 relied on the existence of unreadable marks.
Unfortunately, in the context of ngerprinting the assumption that marks can not become unreadable is unrealistic. As was discussed in Section 2 once a coalition detects a mark, that mark can be made unreadable in various ways (recall that by unreadable we mean that when an illegal copy is discovered it is impossible to determine which state the mark is in). For this reason, the results of Chor, Fiat and Naor by themselves are insu cient for ngerprinting. However, as we shall see, they become quite useful when composed with our results described in the next section.
Construction of collusion secure codes
The idea for the construction c-secure codes is similar to the one used in Section 3.1. We rst construct an (l; n)-code which is n-secure. Thus, no matter how large the coalition is, we will be able to trace an illegal copy back to a member of the coalition with high probability. The length of this code is n O (1) and hence, too large to be practical. We then show how this code can be used to construct c-secure codes for n users whose length is log O(1) (n) when c = O(log n).
We begin by presenting an (l; n)-code which is n-secure with -error for any > 0. Let c m be a column of height n in which the rst m bits are 1 and the rest are 0. denote the codewords of ? 0 (n; d). Before the distributor embeds the codewords of ? 0 (n; d) in an object he makes the following random choice: the distributor randomly picks a permutation 1 2 S l . User u i 's copy of the object will be ngerprinted using the word w (i) . Note that the same permutation is used for all users. The point is that will be kept hidden from the users. Keeping the permutation hidden from the users is equivalent to hiding the information of which mark in the object encodes which bit in the code. It is a bit surprising that this simple random action taken by the distributor is su cient to overcome the barrier of Theorem 4.2 and enables us to prove the following theorem: Theorem 5.1 For n 3 and > 0 let d = 2n 2 log(2n= ). The ngerprinting scheme ? 0 (n; d) is n-secure with -error. 1 S l is the full symmetric group of all permutations on l letters. For a word x 2 f0;1g l and a permutation 2 S l we denote by x the l-bit word x (1) x (2) : : : x (l) .
The length of this code is d(n ? 1) = O(n 3 log n ). To prove the theorem we must describe an algorithm, which given a word x generated 2 by some coalition C, outputs a member of C with probability 1 ? . First we introduce some notation. Before we describe the algorithm we give some intuition. Suppose user s is not a member of the coalition C which produced the word x. The hidden permutation prevents the coalition from knowing which marks represent which bits in the code ? 0 (n; d). The only information the coalition has is the value of the marks it can detect. Observe that without user s a coalition sees exactly the same values for all bit positions i 2 R s . For instance, in the code ? 0 (4; 3) above, the coalition A; C; D sees the exact same bit pattern for all bit positions in R 2 . Hence, for a bit position i 2 R s , the coalition C can not tell if i lies in B s or in B s?1 . This means that whichever strategy they use to set the bits of xj Rs , the 1's in xj Rs will be roughly evenly distributed between xj Bs and xj B s?1 with high probability. Hence, if the 1's in xj Rs are not evenly distributed then, with high probability, user s is a member of the coalition that generated x. Algorithm 1 Given x 2 f0; 1g l , nd a subset of the coalition that produced x. One issue needs some clari cation: the word x found in the illegal copy may contain some unreadable marks`?'. As a convention these bits are set to`0' before the word x is given to Algorithm 1. As a result the algorithm indeed receives a word in f0; 1g l . The correctness of Algorithm 1 is proved in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 5.2 Consider the code ? 0 (n; d) where d = 2n 2 log(2n= ). Let S be the set of users which algorithm 1 pronounces as guilty on input x. Then with probability at least 1 ? , the set S is a subset of the coalition C that produced x.
Proof Suppose user 1 was pronounced guilty, i.e. 1 2 S. Then weight(xj B 1 ) > 0. This implies that user 1 must be a member of C (otherwise the bits in B 1 would be undetectable for C which would imply that weight(xj B 1 ) = 0). Similarly if n 2 S then n 2 C.
Suppose the algorithm pronounces user 1 < s < n as guilty. We show that the probability that s is not guilty is at most =n. This will show that the probability that there exists a user in S which is not guilty is at most . 2 When we say that a coalition C generated a word x, we mean that the bits of x have already been unscrambled using ?1 . For example, the rst bit of x is the value of the mark which encodes the rst bit of the codewords.
Let s be an innocent user, i.e. s 6 2 C. As was discussed above, this means that the coalition C can not distinguish between the bit positions in R s . Since the permutation was chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations, the 1's in xj Rs may be regarded as being randomly placed in xj Rs Thus, if user s is innocent then the probability of her being pronounced guilty by Algorithm 1 is at most =n. Therefore, the probability that some innocent user will be pronounced guilty is at most .
This proves the lemma. The rst condition follows from the fact that R s+1 = B s B s+1 . The second is the inductive hypothesis and the third follows from the fact that user s was not pronounced guilty, i.e. s 6 2 S. We show that these three conditions imply k 0 2(s + 1) 2 log(2n= ) which will prove the claim for s + 1. 
Logarithmic length c-secure codes
The n-secure code constructed in the previous section enables us to use the techniques of 8] to construct c-secure (n; l)-codes of length l = c O(1) log n. We thank Naor for pointing out this relation.
In this section we demonstrate how to apply the simplest technique from 8] to construct a short c-secure code from the n-secure code of the previous section. The basic idea is to use the n-secure code as the alphabet over which the techniques of 8] can be applied.
Let C be an (L; N)-code over an alphabet of size n where the codewords are chosen independently and uniformly at random 3 . The idea is to compose our n-secure code ? 0 (n; d) with the code C as we did in the proof of Lemma 3.2. We call the resulting code ? 0 (L; N; n; d). Thus, the code ? 0 (L; N; n; d) contains N codewords and has length Ld(n ? 1). It is made up of L copies of ? 0 (n; d). We will refer to these copies as the components of ? 0 (L; N; n; d). The point is that the codewords of the code C will be kept hidden from the users. This is in addition to keeping hidden the L permutations used when embedding the L copies of ? 0 (n; d) in the object. To prove the theorem we show an algorithm that nds a member of the guilty coalition and then prove it's correctness. Algorithm 2 Given x 2 f0; 1g l , nd a member of the coalition that produced x. 2. Find the word w 2 C which matches y in the most number of position (ties are broken arbitrarily). 3. Let u be the user whose codeword is derived from w 2 C. output \User u is guilty". Lemma 5.6 Let x be a word which was produced by a coalition C of at most c users. Then with parameters as in Theorem 5.5, Algorithm 2 will output a member of C with probability at least 1 ? . Proof Sketch Let W be the set of codewords in C that correspond to the users in the coalition C. For every 1 i L Algorithm 1 guarantees that y i will match w i for some w 2 W with probability 1 ? =2L. This follows from the choice of d and the fact that in component i the users in C see words from ? 0 (n; d). It follows that the above condition will be satis ed in every component with probability at least 1 ? =2. We refer to this as event A.
Recall that the size of W is at most c. Therefore, when event A occurs there must exist a word w 2 W which matches y in L=c positions. However, since the words in C are random and hidden from the users, any word in C which is not in W is expected to match y in only L=n = L=2c positions. Using the Cherno bound it can be shown that the probability that a random word will match y in L=c positions is less than =2N. Hence, the probability the some word in C n W will match y in L=c positions is at most =2. This shows that when event A occurs, the algorithm will output a member of C with probability at least 1 ? =2. Combining this with the fact that event A occurs with probability at least 1 ? =2 proves the lemma.
A lower bound
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the length of c-secure codes. Proof Recall that ?(u; r) is a function mapping a user u and a random string r to a codeword in f0; 1g l . As we shall see, we may regard r as a xed string in which case every user is assigned a unique We show that all coalitions of c users in 1; : : : ; c + 1 can create the word W r with probability at least . Let C be such a coalition. To create the word W r the coalition must rst determine the value of k 0 . Unfortunately, the coalition cannot do so deterministically (for a xed k it cannot test if a certain bit position i satis es i 2 B r (k) B r (k + 1) since it cannot distinguish between i 2 B r (k + 1) and i 2 B r (k + 2).) Therefore, to determine the value of k 0 the coalition simply guesses it. Since 2 k 0 c ? 2 the correct value is guessed with probability more than 1=c.
Let i be a detectable bit position for C. Since C includes all but one of the users in 1; : : : ; c + 1 it can determine that i 2 B r (k) B r (k + 1) for some k. However, it can not di erentiate the case i 2 B r (k) from i 2 B r (k + 1). Consequently, if the coalition sees the value '1' less than k 0 times in the i'th position (i.e. #fu 2 C s.t. ?(u; r)j i = 1g < k 0 ) it must be case that i 2 B r (k) for some k k 0 .
Therefore, the coalition sets such bit positions to '0' (which is consistent with condition (1) Hence, the coalition succeeds in generation W r if two events occur simoultanously: it correctly guessed k 0 and it correctly sets the bits in locations where it sees '1' k 0 times. The probabiliy that both events simoultanously happen is at least c 1=c = . To summarize, we just proved that for any value of the random string r, any coalition C of c users in 1; : : : ; c + 1 can generate the word W r with probability at least . It follows that the word W r can not be traced back to a single user with probability (since no single user belongs to all these coalitions). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Distribution Scheme
Up until now, we have been ignoring distribution of the uniquely ngerprinted copies. This is fair, as at worst we can send each user an entire unique copy. However, this is impractical for products such as electronic books, software or CD-ROMs which are mass produced. We would like to come up with a scheme in which a user receives a bulk of data common to all users, and a small number of extra bits unique to him. We refer to the bulk of data as the public data and denote it by D. We refer to the extra bits given privately to user u as the private data and denote it by M u . For the distribution scheme to be secure, given (D; M u ), user u should not be able to deduce any information about the ngerprints in copies given to other users.
Throughout this section, let ? be an (l; n)-code which is used to ngerprint the objects. We denote the object to be distributed by P and let L be its length. Assume the object P can be partitioned into l pieces with exactly one mark in each piece. Let p(r; s) be the rth piece which contains the rth mark in state s 2 f0; 1g. For any r, the pieces p(r; 0) and p(r; 1) are interchangeable, that is a copy with one replaced with the other will behave identically. Given a codeword x = x 1 x 2 : : : x l 2 ?, let P(x) = fp(1; x 1 ); p(2; x 2 ); : : : ; p(l; x l )g be the partition set implied by x. Theorem 7. for some xed constant m. The fact that f k is a secure private key cryptosystem implies that for a random key k, given f k (x), no polynomial time predicate can extract one bit of information about x with non negligible probability. This property is crucial for the security of our distribution scheme.
For each piece, p(r; s), pick a random key k(r; s). The public data will be D = ff k(r;s) (p(r; s)) j 1 r l; s 2 f0; 1gg :
The size of D is 2L, twice the size of the original object. Let x 2 ? be the word associated with user u. The private data given to user u is the collection of keys necessary to decrypt his pieces: It is possible to further reduce the size of the private data by using double encryption: we group the keys k(r; s) into blocks. Each block is encrypted and made public. Each user will receive keys that will enable him to decrypt his block of keys. This method requires public data of size O(L) and private data of size O(L 1=m l log L ) for some constant m > 1.
It is worth noting that when implementing this distribution scheme, one can use a standard private key cryptosystem such as DES. Such systems use xed length keys. This leads to private data of length O(l= log(L)).
Conclusions
The most signi cant contribution of these results is to show how to overcome collusion when ngerprinting digital data. To summarize our results, we restrict the size of coalitions to be at most log n where n is the number of users. For the problem of naive redistribution considered in Section 3, we constructed codes of length O(log There are still many open problems which remain to be solved. The most relevant one is that of constructing shorter collusion secure codes. It seems that an n-secure code that is shorter than the one constructed in Section 5 should exist. Indeed, there is some gap between the lower bound of Section 6 and our constructed code. A shorter n-secure code will lead to an improvement in the general construction of c-secure codes as well.
Recall that throughout the paper, we assumed that secure marks can be embedded in the ngerprinted data. A mark encodes a bit of information and is secure if it can only be detected by collusion. To emphasize the fact that we will not be dealing with the implementation of secure marks, we referred to the assumption that they exist as the \Marking Assumption". In many domains, one can construct secure marks with the aid of problems that are believed to be hard. For instance, when ngerprinting movies, a single mark can be encoded by using one camera view point versus another. The choice of one view point versus another in a speci c scene, encodes one bit of information in the lm. Given an image, the problem of transforming the image to an image taken from a di erent view point is believed to be hard. As this method of marking can be used to ngerprint movies, we say that the Marking Assumption holds in the domain of movies.
Showing that the Marking Assumption is satis ed for software is much harder. As was stated in the introduction, there is a great deal of empirical evidence to support the existence of secure marks in software. However, to the best of our knowledge, no formal results exist. Progress in this direction would be of some practical importance.
